Inflation Awakening

The road ahead could look very different for inflation, and investors may want to consider whether they are prepared.

Is inflation coming out of hibernation? A significant breakout of higherinflation is not our base case inflation outlook over the secular (three-to five-year) horizon. However, as labor markets tighten and the globaleconomy feels the ripple effects of growing populism across much of thedeveloped world, higher inflation certainly looks like a bigger risk thanit has been over the past decade.

The idea behind the potentialrude awakeningshighlighted in our latest Secular Outlook is that investors couldbe misled by their rearview mirrors – and inflation is one of the macrofactors that could look substantially different on the road ahead. For thepast 10 years, large output gaps in every part of the world ensured anample supply of labor. This logically translated into lackluster wagegrowth and limited price pressures.

Now nearly a decade into the recovery, unemployment rates have not onlyreturned to pre-crisis levels, but in some instances are reaching recordlows. In the U.S., for example, you’d have to go back almost 20 years tofind an unemployment rate below 4% – and our baseline forecast for 3.5%unemployment by the end of this year would be close to the record low of3.4% in the late 1960s (which preceded one of the largest and longestinflation episodes of the post-war era). In the U.K., unemployment is backto a level last seen in the early 70s. And while southern Europe is stilllagging and has plenty of spare capacity, Germany’s unemployment rate is ata multidecade low.

What happened to the Phillips curve?

Yet despite the tight labor market, wages have remained stagnant. This hasraised questions about the robustness of the so-calledPhillips curve– a cornerstone of most central banks’ frameworks which postulates that asan economy gets close to full employment, wages and inflation shouldaccelerate. Confronted with a long period of subdued inflation, centralbankers are de-emphasizing the predictive power of the Phillips curve andhave remained extremely cautious in removing their extraordinary monetarypolicy accommodation.

But what if the Phillips curve is alive and well, and hidden slack is thereason for depressed wage growth? If this is the case, central bankerscould already be behind the curve and may be keeping rates too low for toolong. And even if this is not the case, a growing number of central bankersappear comfortable with letting inflation run above their targets in orderto re-anchor inflation expectations at a higher level. The Federal Reserveitself is forecasting inflation above 2% in 2019 (as measured by personalconsumption expenditure, or PCE, inflation), yet reaffirmed its view thatinterest rates should be normalized at a slow and gradual pace. The dovishbias of central banks is still solidly anchored.

Fiscal expansion and populism may stoke the fire

Add to tightening labor markets two potentially significant drivers ofeconomic change that we identified in our Secular Forum: fiscal profligacyand rising populism. More and more countries have elected populistgovernments that are introducing serious doses of fiscal expansion throughtax cuts and potentially increased spending – all at a time when one wouldexpect deficits to contract. In the U.S., for instance, the budget deficitis growing despite very low unemployment and limited spare capacity in theeconomy, leading one to logically wonder how real output will be able tomeet the increase in aggregate demand (see Figure 1). And higher demandcoupled with constrained supply is a textbook recipe for higher inflation.

Inflation Awakening – Inflation Outlook Midyear 2018 

The impact of populism doesn’t stop at higher public deficits. Both thepopulist left and the populist right appear unified in their hostilitytoward globalization and trade. U.S.-imposed tariffs have been limited sofar, and we believe even the proposed 10% tariff on $200 billion ofadditional Chinese goods would have a measured impact on inflation; by ourestimates, it would raise core inflation by just 0.1% to 0.15% over thenext 12 months. The proposed tariffs on cars imported from Europe and Japanpose a larger threat, in our view, potentially boosting inflation by asmuch as 0.5%.

What about the tariffs’ longer-term impact? Much would depend on whether the U.S. can repatriate production from low-wage countries – adubious prospect, in our view, given near-full employment and theadministration’s restrictions on immigration. To gauge the potential impactover the next five years, we ran simulations based on the Federal Reserve’s FRB/US macroeconomic models,using different trade elasticities addressing the ability of the U.S.economy to replace imports with domestic production. We found inflation tobe higher in all scenarios, with some persistence effect.

Last but not least, oil prices continue to climb asOPEC struggles to increase outputamid production outages around the world (from Libya to Canada andVenezuela) and thesanctions on Iran.

Old patterns may not hold in a less-benign inflation outcome

While most markets and economists still have a benign view of inflation, wesee a material possibility of higher inflation that could have profoundimplications, not just on real returns across assets, but also on marketvolatility and portfolio construction. Many investors have grown accustomedto the reliably negative correlation between stocks and bonds as they seekto diversify and dampen volatility from portfolios of risky assets.However, as we have pointed out before, thiscorrelation has generally only been reliablewhen inflation is low or falling (see Figure 2).

Inflation Awakening – Inflation Outlook Midyear 2018 

To be sure, we believe high quality bonds will most likely provide aneffective portfolio hedge against the downside potential in risk assets inthe case of a recession, andwe see a recession as likely over the secular horizon; however, as the stock market correction earlierthis year demonstrated, this approach might not work as well if inflationfears are driving the risk-off moves. The correction in early Februarybegan with a much higher-than-expected Consumer Price Index (CPI) print inJanuary, followed by above-consensus wage data in the first week ofFebruary. At the same time, Treasury yields surged. If high quality bondscould not hedge your portfolio, so the logic seemed to go, then the onlyoption was to sell your risky assets – a conclusion that resulted inincreased market volatility and drawdowns in risk assets.

Yet the market assigns a low probability to persistently high inflation, asseen in the term structure of market-based measures of inflationcompensation, such as breakeven inflation (BEI). When comparing yields onnominal Treasuries to those for Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities(TIPS), for example, five-year BEI is now higher, at 2.21%, than 30-yearBEI, at 2.12%. This implies an expectation that inflation pressure willrise in the near term, perhaps due to the impact of higher commodityprices, near-full economic capacity or tariffs, but that inflation riskwill be much lower in the longer term.

Investor takeaways: Preparing for an inflation awakening

Although our baseline inflation outlook does not envision a rapidacceleration over the secular horizon, we see greater inflation risk thanin recent years – and we believe many investors may be underestimating thepossibility of a longer-term inflation surprise. Such longer-term riskcould be very disruptive; as Figure 2 shows, it would imply a change incorrelation between major assets by depressing prices for bonds andequities at the same time. This could be another rude awakening forinvestors who may have assumed their portfolios were balanced.

While we believe investor portfolios in general properly account for growthrisks, we think investors should consider whether they are adequatelyprotected against rising inflation. Considering a standalone or combinedallocation to real assets – such as inflation-linked bonds, commodities,real estate investment trusts (REITs) or other inflation-fighting assets –is one way investors may seek to hedge their portfolios and potentiallyenhance returns in the event that an inflationary regime emerges.

For more of PIMCO’s views on the complex drivers of inflation, please visit our inflation page.



PIMCO Europe Ltd
11 Baker Street
London W1U 3AH, England
+44 (0) 20 3640 1000

PIMCO Europe Ltd - Italy
Corso Matteotti 8
20121 Milan, Italy
+39 02 9475 5400

PIMCO Deutschland GmbH
Seidlstraße 24-24a
80335 Munich, Germany
+49 (0) 89 26209 6000

PIMCO (Schweiz) GmbH
Brandschenkestrasse 41
8002 Zurich, Switzerland
Tel: + 41 44 512 49 10

PIMCO Europe Ltd (Company No. 2604517) and PIMCO Europe Ltd - Italy (Company No. 07533910969) are authorised and regulated by the Financial Conduct Authority (25 The North Colonnade, Canary Wharf, London E14 5HS) in the UK. The Italy branch is additionally regulated by the CONSOB in accordance with Article 27 of the Italian Consolidated Financial Act. PIMCO Europe Ltd services and products are available only to professional clients as defined in the Financial Conduct Authority’s Handbook and are not available to individual investors, who should not rely on this communication. | PIMCO Deutschland GmbH (Company No. 192083, Seidlstr. 24-24a, 80335 Munich, Germany) and PIMCO Deutschland GmbH Swedish Branch (SCRO Reg. No. 516410-9190) are  authorised and regulated by the German Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) (Marie- Curie-Str. 24-28, 60439 Frankfurt am Main) in Germany in accordance with Section 32 of the German Banking Act (KWG). The Swedish Branch is additionally supervised by the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (Finansinspektionen) in accordance with Chapter 25 Sections 12-14 of the Swedish Securities Markets Act. he services provided by PIMCO Deutschland GmbH are available only to professional clients as defined in Section 31a para. 2 German Securities Trading Act (WpHG). They are not available to individual investors, who should not rely on this communication. | PIMCO (Schweiz) GmbH (registered in Switzerland, Company No. CH-, Brandschenkestrasse 41, 8002 Zurich, Switzerland, Tel: + 41 44 512 49 10. The services and products provided by PIMCO (Schweiz) GmbH are not available to individual investors, who should not rely on this communication but contact their financial adviser.

Past performance is not a guarantee or a reliable indicator of futureresults.

Investing in the bond market is subject to risks,including market, interest rate, issuer, credit, inflation risk, andliquidity risk. The value of most bonds and bond strategies are impacted bychanges in interest rates. Bonds and bond strategies with longer durationstend to be more sensitive and volatile than those with shorter durations;bond prices generally fall as interest rates rise, and the current lowinterest rate environment increases this risk. Current reductions in bondcounterparty capacity may contribute to decreased market liquidity andincreased price volatility. Bond investments may be worth more or less thanthe original cost when redeemed. Inflation-linked bonds (ILBs) issued by a government arefixed income securities whose principal value is periodically adjustedaccording to the rate of inflation; ILBs decline in value when realinterest rates rise. Treasury Inflation-Protected Securities (TIPS) are ILBsissued by the U.S. government. Commodities contain heightened risk, including market,political, regulatory and natural conditions, and may not be suitable forall investors. REITs are subject to risk, such as poorperformance by the manager, adverse changes to tax laws or failure toqualify for tax-free pass-through of income.

There is no guarantee that these investment strategies will work under allmarket conditions or are suitable for all investors and each investorshould evaluate their ability to invest long-term, especially duringperiods of downturn in the market. Investors should consult theirinvestment professional prior to making an investment decision.

Correlationis a statistical measure of how two securities move in relation to eachother. The correlation of various indexes or securities against one anotheror against inflation is based upon data over a certain time period. Thesecorrelations may vary substantially in the future or over different timeperiods that can result in greater volatility.

The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is an unmanaged indexrepresenting the rate of inflation of the U.S. consumer prices asdetermined by the U.S. Department of Labor Statistics. There can be noguarantee that the CPI or other indexes will reflect the exact level ofinflation at any given time. The S&P 500 Index is anunmanaged market index generally considered representative of the stockmarket as a whole. The index focuses on the Large-Cap segment of the U.S.equities market. It is not possible to invest directly in an unmanagedindex.

This material contains the opinions of the manager and such opinions aresubject to change without notice. This material has been distributed forinformational purposes only. Forecasts, estimates and certain informationcontained herein are based upon proprietary research and should not beconsidered as investment advice or a recommendation of any particularsecurity, strategy or investment product. Information contained herein hasbeen obtained from sources believed to be reliable, but not guaranteed. Nopart of this material may be reproduced in any form, or referred to in anyother publication, without express written permission. PIMCO is a trademarkof Allianz Asset Management of America L.P. in the United States andthroughout the world. ©2018, PIMCO.

Why Commodity Carry May Be Higher Than You Think
XDismiss Next Article